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1. Introduction 
 
The economic governance of the European Union, and especially of 
the Eurozone, has seen a rapid development since the Maastricht 
Treaty was signed in 1992 and European Monetary Union (EMU) 
started in 1999. Governance means the specific ways of deciding 
and implementing policies through informal rules and formal insti-
tutions and a set of agreed objectives. Different institutional ar-
rangements and policy-orientations define different regimes of gov-
ernance. In this paper I will look at whether the EU’s economic ar-
rangements are consistent with its objectives.  
 
The Treaty set the institutional framework for policy coordination 
through the triad of an independent European Central Bank (art. 
105), the Excessive Deficit Procedure (art. 104) and multilateral 
surveillance through the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines 
(BEPG) (art. 99). Subsequently a whole range of complementing 
processes, methods and strategies have been introduced, starting 
with the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 1996/97, the European 
Employment Strategy (Luxemburg Process) 1997, the Cardiff Proc-
ess 1998 for product and capital market reform, and the Macroeco-
nomic Dialogue (Cologne Process) 1999. Some of these procedures, 
notably the SGP and the Macroeconomic Dialog focus more on sta-
bilisation policies, the policy mix and demand management, others 
like the Luxemburg and Cardiff Process emphasise “structural re-
forms” and the supply side. The Lisbon Strategy in 2000 has also 
institutionalised the special Spring European Councils and devel-
oped the “Open Method of Coordination” (OMC), which was fur-
ther fine-tuned at the European Councils in Stockholm (2001), Bar-
celona (2002) and Brussels (2003).  
 
The Lisbon European Council in 2000 designed a comprehensive 
and integrated strategy for all these separate processes by stipulat-
ing to make Europe “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-
based economy in the world, capable of sustaining economic 
growth with more and better jobs and greater cohesion” (European 
Council, 2000) The overall strategy was based on four policy areas: 
(1) Transition to a knowledge-based economy and society by foster-
ing the information society, R&D and innovation, and stepping up 
structural reform. (2) Completing the single market, especially for 224  European Political Economy Review  
 
financial services in order to facilitate higher investment. (3) Mod-
ernising the European social model by investing in people and com-
bating social exclusion. (4) Sustaining favourable economic growth 
by an appropriate macroeconomic policy mix. 
 
Progress on realizing the Lisbon agenda has been slow. Not surpris-
ingly, the efficiency of Europe’s complex governance has been 
questioned (Begg, Hodson, Maher, 2003; Calmfors and Corsetti, 
2003; Gros and Hobza, 2001, Collignon, 2001) and concern about 
the democratic legitimacy of existing policy procedures (“closeness 
to the EU’s citizens” in the language of the European Council’s 
Laeken Declaration, 2001) has motivated setting up the European 
Convention now working on a European Constitution.  
 
With the exception of the European Central Bank and possibly the 
Convention, all of the recent institutional innovations have 
strengthened intergovernmental policy coordination; no further pol-
icy conferrals to the European level have taken place, while new 
procedures like the Open Method of Coordination, have been ex-
tolled as “reorganising the modes of European construction” (Telò, 
2002). This may reflect a general trend toward more intergovern-
mentalism. Yet, the optimality of this development should be ques-
tioned. While economic integration requires institutions endowed 
with the authority to enact Europe-wide policies, this need may be 
traded off against costs from imposing identical policies upon het-
erogeneous groups (Alesina and Wacziarg, 1999; for a critique see 
Collignon 2003). Therefore subsidiarity is supposed to be welfare 
increasing.
1 
 
We need to understand whether the newly developed methods of in-
tergovernmental coordination are appropriate for the tasks they are 
meant to accomplish. While not all European objectives need to be 
decided or implemented by a centralised authority, it is also clear 
that not all forms of intergovernmental policy coordination will 
                                                 
1   However, the increasingly prominent role of the European Council and the 
development of the Open Method of intergovernmental policy Coordination 
were less a conscious decision for welfare improvement, but rather the sec-
ond-best option after the failure to adopt common targets and policies. See 
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have the same effectiveness. There is a role for both intergovern-
mentalism and the community method. We need to establish criteria 
which policy regimes are likely to produce best results.  
 
In this paper, I will look at the different coordination regimes, 
which are institutionalised in the Open Method of Coordination 
(OMC), the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG) and the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and the rules underlying their im-
plementation. I will first discuss the need for policy coordination, 
and then assess their success in implementation. In conclusion I will 
draw some lessons for the design of a European Constitution. 
 
 
2.  The need for policy coordination 
 
Externalities: the rationale for policy coordination 
 
The institutional developments in economic policy-making reflect 
the recognition that “a proper functioning of EMU requires a well-
developed coordination framework” (European Commission, 
2002:3). This requirement is derived from the fact that although 
monetary policy is fully unified under the authority of the ECB, 
most other policy areas maintain separate national policy-making 
competences. Because policy preferences are defined in national 
constituencies, different governments have different preferences 
and objectives. But at the same time the growing interdependence 
between national economies within the same monetary framework 
has led to an increasing range of spillovers into other jurisdictions. 
Many policy variables such as common inflation, interest and ex-
change rates, but also the aggregate fiscal stance are now produced 
“jointly” (von Hagen and Mundschenk, 2002). What one member 
state does, increasingly affects all others and inconsistent policy ob-
jectives would lead to welfare lowering outcomes. The internalisa-
tion of these externalities creates the need for policy coordination.  
 
Policy coordination is therefore necessary when there are autono-
mous and non-unified decision-makers - with possibly incompatible 
(disjunct) preferences and objectives  - and when their actions cause 
spillovers into each other’s jurisdictions. Hence, policy coordination 
is a necessary feature of intergovernmentalism. But besides the ar-226  European Political Economy Review  
 
gument of interdependence calling for cooperation, we must also 
consider preference change over time as a crucial element in setting 
up efficient governance structures. If different actors converge to 
pursuing the same objectives, other forms of coordination are re-
quired than if preferences are disjunct and inflexible. Furthermore, 
if policy objectives need to be revalued in changed circumstances, 
discretionary forms of policy-making are more adequate, than if one 
needs to stick to a given policy rule over time. These considerations 
determine different regimes of policy coordination, as I will explain 
in the next section. 
 
Commonly, four arguments are made to explain the need for coor-
dination and these potential benefits apply to both supply and de-
mand side policies: (1) National actions or policies may spill over 
directly into neighbouring countries. For example, state aids may 
cause distortions in the single market and must therefore be con-
trolled at the European level. (2) Indirect effects are particularly 
prevalent for European collective goods. Macroeconomic variables 
like inflation, interest or exchange rates concern all economic 
agents in Euroland and if independent national policy actions would 
cause the ECB to adjust monetary policy, the economic conditions 
in the whole area would be affected. (3) Coordination should pre-
vent or reduce the likelihood of free-rider behaviour by member-
states. (4) Some political economy theories argue that policy coor-
dination may be useful in deflecting criticism of unpopular but nec-
essary policy action at the national level (Drazen, 2000). 
 
Objections to policy coordination have focused on three aspects 
mainly related to macroeconomic coordination and demand man-
agement: (1) The size of spillover effects and potential gains from 
cooperation may be small (Gros and Hobza, 2001; Curie et alt. 
1989). For example, the aggregate demand effect of government 
spending may be compensated by rising interest rates, at least if the 
economy is close to equilibrium. (2) Policy coordination may cause 
potential dangers to the independence of the European Central Bank 
(Alesina et al. 2001; Issing, 2002). (3) A more general objection is 
that the observed differences in national policy preferences require 
independent policies to accommodate different “tastes” (Alesina 
and Wacziarg, 1999). The first two objections are related to the effi-
cient policy mix in Euroland, the third is about its optimality and is Collignon: Is Europe going far enough? 227 
 
analytically distinct from efficiency considerations. I will return to 
preference heterogeneity below. Here I will only insist that an effi-
cient policy mix is a necessary condition for the sustainability of 
macroeconomic stability, but different policy mixes may also set 
different incentives for economic growth and improvements at the 
supply-side of the economy. Therefore there are many potential 
spillovers between different policy domains and coordination be-
tween independent actors is one way of achieving consistency be-
tween their actions.  
 
However, if coordination fails to produce a coherent set of actions, 
delegation of decision-making to a central authority may be re-
quired. The European governance framework has tackled the issue 
of coordination from four different perspectives. 
 
(1) Efficient macroeconomic policy is to ensure that the economy 
achieves non-inflationary, stable growth and high employment 
(TEU, art. 2). This implies that policy is actually capable of deliver-
ing these collective goods. Although this claim is not undisputed, it 
now seems to command a reasonable consensus among professional 
economists (Allsopp and Vines, 2000). In particular, there is agree-
ment that inflation is ultimately always a monetary phenomenon 
and therefore the central bank needs to be independent to prevail 
against other actors when there are inflationary shocks. But this in-
dependence also requires that monetary policy-making is unambi-
guously centralised in the European System of Central Banks. The 
creation of the ECB was an indispensable condition for the consis-
tent design of monetary policy. However, European central bank 
independence implies a rather unique coordination regime for 
monetary and fiscal policy. 
 
 (2) Even if the central bank is independent, non-cooperative games 
between monetary and fiscal authorities can lead to destabilising 
outcomes when the objectives between the two are not consistent 
(Sargent and Wallace, 1981). Therefore fiscal policy needs to be 
constrained. This was the economic rationale behind the Stability 
and Growth Pact. By stipulating precise rules for “avoiding exces-
sive deficits”, the pact reduces the potentially destabilising power of 
fiscal authorities and frees the ECB to set interest rates compatible 
with macro economic equilibrium. Whether this always happens is 228  European Political Economy Review  
 
another matter and subject to intensive debate, but this is how the 
system is supposed to work. Yet, one needs to emphasise that its 
logic is based on the interaction between the single monetary policy 
and the European aggregate fiscal stance. Under Europe’s present 
day economic governance, this aggregate is only indirectly defined 
by the SGP, which stipulates one budget rule applying to all - 
namely “close to balance or in surplus” over the medium term, so 
that the aggregate structural budget position is also in balance. 
 
(3) Even if all national budgets were in perfect balance, inflationary 
pressures could still emerge from nominal wage settlements exceed-
ing labour productivity increases. Sustained unit labour cost in-
creases above the ECB inflation target would provoke monetary 
tightening with negative spillover effects via interest and exchange 
rates on economic growth in the short term, but through investment 
also on capacity and employment in the long run (Collignon, 1999; 
2002: chapter 8). The institutional tool for internalising these exter-
nalities was the creation of the Macroeconomic Dialogue. Policy 
coordination under the Cologne Process has been fairly soft, i.e. 
non-constraining, partly because the ECB refused ex ante coordina-
tion as a matter of principle, partly because the nature of wage bar-
gaining in Europe is so diversified that uniform procedures are nei-
ther applicable nor desirable. The Macroeconomic Dialogue primar-
ily works through the improved flow of information that clarifies 
the macroeconomic environment for wage bargainers. 
 
(4) An efficient policy mix will keep aggregate supply and demand 
in balance. But it will also have an effect on the growth potential of 
the EU economy, although the impact may be limited. The trans-
mission mechanism from stabilisation policy to long-term economic 
growth works essentially through investment in the stock of physi-
cal and human capital (Collignon, 2002). Higher growth therefore 
requires a macroeconomic policy mix that creates an incentive for 
investment, but this effect would be significantly amplified if struc-
tural reform policies created positive externalities in the form of 
higher productivity. In the context of the European policy frame-
work, the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG) are supposed 
to internalise these reciprocal externalities between macroeconomic 
management and structural reforms by formulating a coherent 
document that gives orientation to national policy-makers. The pro-Collignon: Is Europe going far enough? 229 
 
cedures for the coordination of supply-side reforms were already set 
by the Luxemburg and Cardiff Processes, but only the Lisbon Strat-
egy set out the overall design for achieving these growth and wel-
fare improvements, with the “Open Method of Coordination” 
(OMC) as its instrument. The OMC is now applied in very different 
fields, where general guidelines or objectives at European level are 
being translated into national action programs (Rodrigues, 2003). 
 
Hence, the EU has both a need for and a wide range of instruments 
for policy coordination. But how are they used? 
 
 
Governance regimes as forms of coordination 
 
Welfare increasing policy coordination can be modelled as a game, 
where the payoff to the players is highest when they coordinate 
their strategy. The constitutional question is which mechanisms al-
low independent authorities to consistently Pareto-improve welfare 
over time. We know from game theory that choice consistency is 
more easily established in sequential and repetitive games than in 
games with simultaneous moves,
2 but this advantage comes at the 
potential cost of dynamic inconsistency with related problems of 
credibility (Kydland and Prescott, 1977). As we will see, the coor-
dination between monetary and fiscal authorities can easily be set 
up as a sequential game, but intergovernmental coordination, like 
the definition of the aggregate fiscal policy stance, can not. 
 
Successful policy coordination has two dimensions: the consistency 
of objectives between autonomous partners and the dynamics in the 
interactions over time. If different actors make their decisions si-
multaneously, they may create positive or negative spillovers or ex-
ternalities for others, who may anticipate them and respond by tak-
ing these decisions into account. If their strategies are mutually con-
sistent, a Nash equilibrium exists, although the outcome is not nec-
essarily Pareto efficient. Policy coordination is then one way of im-
proving the outcome for both. The related compliance problems can 
be dealt with by setting up specific incentive structures (positive 
rewards, negative sanctions and institutions as commitment devices) 
                                                 
2   For a good introductory overview, see Varian, 2003. 230  European Political Economy Review  
 
or by convincing others of the “rightness” of a proposed action.
3 In 
the first case preferences remain given and fixed, and feasible out-
comes are the result of strategic bargaining and side-payments. In 
the second case, the policy preferences actually change due to pub-
lic deliberation. The relative importance given to incentives and 
persuasion distinguishes hard from soft coordination regimes. The 
flexibility by which policy objectives can be changed determines 
the degree of discretion versus rule-governed policy actions. 
 
When decision-making is sequential, ex ante coordination is not 
necessary and can be replaced by implicit coordination. Actions are 
then coordinated between a leader and follower. A typical case is 
the interaction of fiscal and monetary policy in EMU. The ECB in-
terprets its status of independence as incompatible with ex ante co-
ordination. Indeed, if a previous commitment to coordinated policy 
action would constrain the ECB’s capacity to react in case of any 
inflationary shock, it may loose de facto independence and the 
credibility of its commitment to maintain price stability. But this 
does not necessarily prevent the central bank from setting interest 
rates at a level that is consistent with macroeconomic equilibrium. 
In contrast to the Sargent and Wallace (1981) framework of a 
‘chicken game’, interactions between European fiscal and monetary 
policy should be modelled as a sequential game, where the ECB is 
the Stackelberg follower. The sum of national budget positions first 
determines the aggregate fiscal stance in Euroland, while the ECB 
preserves the freedom to decide which monetary policy stance is 
compatible with it. The potential handicaps of this institutional set-
up are limited by the ex ante constraint of the SGP on national 
budget positions and by the commitment of the ECB to a conserva-
tive attitude on fiscal policy.
4 The sequential model of fiscal and 
monetary policy coordination therefore reduces the inflationary 
dangers of “unpleasant monetary arithmetic” without jeopardizing 
the possibility of an efficient policy mix. Hence, monetary and fis-
cal policy in EMU is only indirectly and sequentially coordinated, 
                                                 
3   In game-theoretic terms, this means changing the payoff-matrix for specified 
actions.  
4   This conservative line of insisting on the need for fiscal consolidation is fre-
quently re-iterated in ECB publications, but also in the confidential discus-
sions in the Eurogroup, as the author could witness in 1999. Collignon: Is Europe going far enough? 231 
 
i.e. ex post, and not simultaneously or ex ante.
5 The ECB is appar-
ently operating with such sequential model in mind:  
“…there are no convincing arguments in favour of attempts to co-ordinate 
macroeconomic policies ex ante in order to achieve an overall policy mix 
favourable to growth and employment. On the contrary, attempts that ex-
tend beyond the informal exchange of views and information give rise to 
the risk of confusing the specific roles, mandates and responsibilities of 
the policies in question. They thereby reduce the transparency of the over-
all economic policy framework for the general public, and tend to prevent 
the individual policy makers from being held accountable. (…) Obviously, 
if national governments and social partners take the single monetary pol-
icy’s credible commitment to maintain price stability as given, when de-
ciding on their actions, this will lead to implicitly coordinated policy out-
comes ex post, while at the same time limiting policy conflicts and overall 
economic uncertainty.” Issing (2002) 
Coordinating monetary and fiscal authorities is one thing, policy 
coordination between European governments is quite a different one. 
The issue is that here sequential or implicit coordination is not pos-
sible because the strategic interactions may resemble the prisoner’s 
dilemma. In this case policy coordination by contracting and pun-
ishment for defaulting would improve the policy outcome. For ex-
ample, the aggregate fiscal stance is determined by all member 
states simultaneously. National governments retain responsibility 
for national budgetary and structural policies with high potential for 
spillovers, but they are exclusively accountable to their domestic 
constituencies. Hence, there is no European institution able to pro-
vide “implicit” leadership to others. But if fiscal rectitude is politi-
cally costly at home, although Pareto-optimal for the Union, a 
dominant strategy would be to behave with fiscal laxity. Hence the 
need to establish coordination rules in the form of the Stability and 
Growth Pact. This is probably the most prominent coordination 
problem in Europe today, but the argument also applies to a much 
wider range of policies.  
 
Traditionally, the European Union has used four methods to deal 
with the externalities caused by simultaneous decision-making of 
autonomous governments.  
                                                 
5    The same argument can be made for the implicit “coordination” between 
monetary and wage policies. 232  European Political Economy Review  
 
(1) Voluntary coordination between member states. If governments 
can agree in advance on what they want, policies are ex ante coor-
dinated through consensus. There is then no risk of default, because 
each individual government does exactly what they all want to be 
done collectively. Hence voluntary coordination requires preference 
convergence between different actors. Specific coordination proc-
esses serve to facilitate the emergence of a consistent policy con-
sensus. The Macroeconomic Dialogue under the Cologne process 
and the Open Method of Coordination are forms of voluntary coor-
dination where public deliberation, the exchange of information, 
and peer pressure through naming and shaming are to facilitate pol-
icy preference convergence. The subsequent voluntary commitment 
to common objectives would eliminate negative externalities and 
create welfare effects from policy coordination. However, this form 
of coordination only applies to discretionary policy making, as vol-
untary agreements are made case by case, issue by issue and each 
partner retains the full sovereignty to join or withdraw from the 
process. Begg, Hodson and Maher (2003) call this the “loose mode 
of coordination in the EU.” 
 
(2) Binding rules are necessary when the short-term preferences of 
different actors are inconsistent with their long-term preferences. 
Simple voluntary adherence to coordinated policy action is not 
enough to ensure compliance over time, as the actors are autono-
mous and free to withdraw from the agreement in the future. By 
making a binding commitment to an agreed long-term goal, dy-
namic consistency between multiple policy plans can be established. 
However, this poses another problem: will different autonomous ac-
tors honour their commitment to the policy rule over time? If the 
preferences of different actors are disjunct and do not converge over 
time, non-compliance is highly likely and a regime of hard sanc-
tions is required in order to deter deviating behaviour. The regime 
of sanctions changes the pay-off matrix and therefore the incentives 
for strategic behaviour. Hard policy sanctions provide peguvian dis-
torting incentives. The typical example is the Excessive Deficit Pro-
cedure, which has been further ‘hardened’ by the sanctions envis-
aged by the Stability and Growth Pact. Explicit Treaty provisions 
establish the coercive mechanisms as legally binding obligations. I 
will return to the question of legality below. 
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(3) Between hard and loose modes of coordination stands the inter-
mediary regime of soft rules. Begg, Hodson and Maher (2003) refer 
to this regime as the “guided” coordination of the BEPG and the 
Luxemburg Process. If the policy preferences between actors con-
verge, they are more likely to act in a similar and consistent fashion 
given a specific set of circumstances. A policy rule is then neces-
sary to prevent dynamic inconsistencies, but non-compliance by in-
dividual actors is less an issue and therefore requires only a “soft” 
sanction regime.
6 Soft coercive mechanisms, such as “naming and 
shaming”, are not legally binding, although the exchange of infor-
mation, collective learning and peer pressure do contribute to the 
convergence of preferences. Agreed policy documents, like the 
BEPG or the National Action Plans for Employment, formulate 
rules as guidelines or focal points for medium term policies, while 
the implementation of policies is revalued on an annual basis, al-
lowing a certain degree of discretion in policy making. 
 
(4) Finally, the community method of delegation, now called ‘con-
ferral’ in the new constitution draft, transfers policy-making compe-
tencies to a unified agent such as to the European Commission or 
the European Central Bank. In this case, policy decisions are no 
longer made by autonomous actors with responsibilities to different 
constituencies and a need for ex ante coordination. Instead the uni-
fied authority formulates and implements policies with respect to an 
enlarged constituency, internalising all externalities by legally 
obliging other actors or governments. Delegation is the appropriate 
policy regime when national policy preferences are disjunct and 
discretionary decisions need to be taken, for otherwise anarchy and 
conflict dominate and prevent welfare improvement. 
 
We can summarise these different policy regimes in figure 1. The 
two dimensions are preference consistency between actors and time 
consistency between actions. Disjunct preferences require “hard” 
regimes of legally binding policy decisions in order to internalise 
the spillovers of externalities. If dynamic consistency can be 
achieved by formulating a general obligatory policy rule, then coor-
dination of autonomous actors is possible, provided they stick to the 
                                                 
6   Of course, the problem of collective compliance to the rule and the temptation 
of dynamic inconsistencies for the coordinated policy still persist. 234  European Political Economy Review  
 
rules. If, however, policy decisions need to be revalued frequently 
and actors have disjunct preferences, they may be better off in dele-
gating policy making to a centralised authority acting as the agent 
of a larger constituency. Both regimes pose questions of democratic 
legitimacy, discussed below. On the other hand, if heterogeneous 
preferences converge to a generally accepted policy consensus, due 
to public deliberation, mutual persuasion and learning, then the 
simple exchange of information and less constraining forms of pol-
icy coordination may be sufficient to improve welfare. Voluntary 
cooperation would be appropriate for specific discretionary issues, 
while a soft and flexible framework of policy rules would allow the 
integration of voluntary cooperation into dynamically consistent 
policy programs.   
 
 
Figure 1: Policy Coordination Regimes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The evolution of these governance regimes seems to follow a trial-
and-error path. When neo-functionalist federalists encountered re-
sistance, they moved to softer forms of coordination which opened 
the way for hard coordination again. I will now ask whether we can 
find an underlying logic to these regime choices.  
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3.  Collective goods: linking externalities and coordination            
regimes 
 
We may interpret the outcome of policy decisions as collective 
goods. The classical definition of public goods is that (1) once pro-
duced they are available in the same amount to all the affected con-
sumers (jointness of supply) and (2) that everyone must consume 
the same amount of the good, i.e. the supply of the good cannot be 
restricted to those who produced it (non-rivalness for consumption). 
However, as figure 2 shows, the concept of collective goods is lar-
ger. If only condition (1) holds but not (2), the collective good is 
called a club good; in the opposite case it is a common property re-
source. 
 
Collective goods, characterised by different externalities, require 
different forms of governance. However, the link is not a simple 
transposition from figure 2 to figure 1. The crucial distinction lies in 
the nature of expectations formed by autonomous actors regarding 
their pay-offs and the implications for interactive equilibria. 
  
 
Figure 2. Typology of Collective Goods   
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Olson (1971) has shown that the club goods in box III of figure 2 
are inclusive goods in the sense that (below a given capacity limit) 
an existing club may increase the total benefit from membership by 
admitting new members. For example, the value of my membership 
of a Tennis club may increase when I can draw on a larger pool of 
potential partners to play with. In this case the benefits of individual 
members are complementary to each other. The recent literature on 
network externalities has also observed the positive correlation be-
tween benefits and the number of group members. As Katz and 
Shapiro (1985)  formulate it: “There are many products for which 
the utility that a user derives from consumption of the good in-
creases with the number of other agents consuming the good.” They 
defined the concept of network externality as: “[T]he utility that a 
given user derives from a good depends upon the number of other 
users who are in the same network”.  
 
The interactions between agents determine the level of payoffs and 
can therefore be related to collective goods. Cooper and John 
(1988) have provided a general framework that goes one step fur-
ther to the level of actors’ strategies.
7  They show that strategic 
complementarities arise if an increase in one player’s strategy in-
creases the optimal strategy of the other players. This can lead to 
multiple symmetric Nash equilibria, where mutual gains from a 
possible change in strategy may not be realised, because no individ-
ual player has an incentive to deviate from the initial equilibrium. 
Thus, strategic complementarities would prevent an optimal alloca-
tion of inclusive collective goods, unless a mechanism is in place to 
ensure that coordination failure is overcome. It can be shown that 
inefficiencies due to strategic complementarities can be Pareto-
improved by ensuring that all agents have equal access to informa-
tion allowing them to deviate from an initially sub-optimal equilib-
rium and reap the full benefits offered by network externalities (see 
Benassi et al. 1994). 
 
These models are useful for our understanding of policy coordina-
tion. In fact, the positive spillover of a given common policy on any 
                                                 
7   Technically, spillover models look at the first derivative of a collective utility 
function, strategic cooperation failure models focus on the second cross de-
rivative. Collignon: Is Europe going far enough? 237 
 
individual jurisdiction would only take place, if all individual gov-
ernments were convinced that their marginal contribution to the 
common policy has a positive effect on their own constituency,
8 
otherwise they will abstain. In this case collective preferences be-
tween autonomous actors will converge, and this is exactly what the 
soft policy coordination regimes in box III and IV of figure 1 are 
supposed to achieve: increased flow of information, exchange of 
best practices, peer pressure are all mechanisms to “tip” a policy 
network away from an initial sub-optimal equilibrium and moving it 
to a higher Pareto-dominated equilibrium.
9 This logic has two im-
plications: (1) Due to strategic complementarities, voluntary policy 
coordination and adherence to guiding rules will be forthcoming if, 
and only if, a soft institutional structure ensures the “tipping” of the 
preference convergence. (2) The group of decision-makers can be 
large, as network externalities increase strategic complementarities. 
Hence voluntary and soft policy coordination is the appropriate re-
gimes for the provision of inclusive collective goods. 
 
However, the case is different for exclusive collective goods, i.e. 
common resource goods (box III in figure 2). Policy coordination 
for exclusive collective goods is hampered by strategic substituta-
bilities, which can be caused by two different forms of externalities. 
(1) Although consumption of inclusive collective goods is the same 
for all group members, their access (supply) is rival, meaning that 
the share of benefits for each group member falls as the number of 
participants increases.
10 As a consequence, the feedback to the ex-
pectations of existing group members is negative. This creates stra-
tegic substitutabilities i.e. the second cross derivative of the utility 
function is negative. The individual marginal benefit for a new or 
deviating member of the group is positive, but for existing or con-
forming members it is negative. Thus, there exists an incentive to 
go against the collective interest (such as the SGP) insofar as exist-
ing members’ willingness to pay for collective goods will be re-
duced as the number of group members increases. Large groups will 
therefore become “latent” in Olson’s (1971) terminology, i.e. the 
likelihood of a large group providing an exclusive collective good 
                                                 
8   For the formal deduction of this argument refer to Cooper and John, 1988. 
9   On “tipping” see Katz and Shapiro, 1994 
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voluntarily will diminish. (2) Because benefits are the same for all 
group members, but access is rival, it is possible to externalise pro-
duction costs to others and free-ride. For example, uncoordinated 
borrowing in the financial markets by any public authority could 
cause externalities with respect to interest and exchange rates or in-
flation that would affect all other authorities within the same cur-
rency area. However, the free-rider benefits from low interest rates 
“produced” by other member-states’ collective fiscal restraint and 
this creates an incentive for non-compliance with the policy rule. 
Therefore hard forms of policy coordination or even, as in the case 
of monetary policy, delegation to a European authority are required 
in order to provide these collective goods efficiently. The argument 
applies with force to the determination of aggregate fiscal policy as 
an instrument of stabilisation, because implicit coordination is im-
possible, but also to a range of other policy coordination issues, in-
cluding a common foreign and security policy.  
 
The two points can interact. The zero-sum game quality attached to 
common resource goods provides an incentive to keep the group of 
collective decision-makers small, for otherwise one risks the non-
provision of the collective good.
11 But if the group is enlarged, the 
provision of collective goods will be reduced and ultimately cease. 
Hence, intergovernmental voluntary policy coordination will not be 
sufficient to provide large groups of countries with an efficient or 
even optimal amount of collective goods.
12 A consistent approach 
to policy coordination for such goods requires “hard” regimes of 
governance. Thus, the boxes I and II in figure 1 are governance 
regimes necessary for the provision of exclusive collective goods. 
However, it is also clear that the regime described in box II, where 
governments keep their autonomy, will become increasingly less 
effective as the European Union enlarges to new members. Strategic 
substitutabilities will undermine adherence to and compliance with 
the rules however “hard” they may be. This is the “collective action 
problem” of European integration. It implies that governments can-
                                                 
11  Olson 1971:28 argued that large groups have a tendency to provide them-
selves with no collective goods at all, whereas small groups tended towards a 
sub-optimal provision of collective goods. 
12  In Collignon 2003:113, I have discussed the welfare-enhancing role of the 
Franco-German axis for European integration in this context. Collignon: Is Europe going far enough? 239 
 
not be the ultimate source of European political legitimacy. Because 
the problem becomes more acute after enlargement, a profound re-
think of Europe’s economic governance in a Union of 25 or more 
member-states is unavoidable unless half a century of integration is 
to be undone. 
 
 
4.   Assessing Policy Coordination – The efficiency of today’s 
regime 
 
How efficient is the EU’s economic governance? We would expect 
that soft coordination regimes may be sufficient to provide inclusive 
collective goods. But we will see now, hard coordination regimes 
are no guarantee for the optimal provision of exclusive goods. More 
integration by conferral is then the appropriate response. 
 
In recent years, policy processes have focussed on providing inclu-
sive collective goods by intergovernmental forms of coordination. 
This is particularly evident for objectives defined by the Lisbon 
Strategy that display, by definition, quasi-network externalities. Ex-
amples are policies for the Information Society, such as the deregu-
lation of telecommunications, cyber space, digital TV, or creating a 
single sky.  These network goods also have spillover effects on 
other sectors like human resources, agreeing on a Community pat-
ent or integrating a Europe-wide financial market (European Coun-
cil, 2003). By following the benchmarks set out by the coordination 
process, member states increase their competitive advantages. 
Hence, there are strategic complementarities between their actions 
and it is not surprising that European integration has progressed in 
these policy areas in recent years.  
 
However, these successes apply mainly to inclusive public goods 
with network externalities. For inclusive goods outside networks, 
progress is much slower. For example, the liberalisation of energy 
markets, implementing the Lamfalussy report on capital market in-
tegration, or research policies aimed at increasing R&D by the pri-
vate sector have been tedious, to say the least. Little progress has 
been achieved on social cohesion, pension reform or a European 
framework for social protection that would facilitate cross border 
labour mobility. In most of these cases we witness little conver-240  European Political Economy Review  
 
gence of national policy preferences. National governments protect 
particular interests relevant to their national constituencies and this 
prevents not only convergence, but often even the implementation 
of previous agreements.
13  
 
While soft coordination seems to work on balance for inclusive 
goods, the policy regime of hard coordination is facing serious dif-
ficulties, not only with efficiency, but also with legitimacy. Espe-
cially in EMU, there is now a wide range of public policies creating 
exclusive  collective goods. The theory of fiscal federalism has 
shown (Oates, 1972) that macroeconomic stabilisation policy is an 
important subset of such exclusive goods. The experience with the 
Stability and Growth Pact has also revealed that stabilisation poli-
cies are dominated by strategic substitutabilities in the context of 
discretionary policies. It is less the Pact’s long-term objective that 
poses problems, but its application in changing economic circum-
stances. This fact reflects well-known problems of dynamic consis-
tency inherent in fiscal policy. But much less discussed are the is-
sues of legitimate collective preference change. Given the auton-
omy of national budget policies and the preponderate role of na-
tional Parliaments, policy preferences are in fact exogenously given 
and disjunct. The EU has no mechanism to facilitate European-wide 
preference change in this domain through the deliberation of citi-
zens and voters.  
 
The coordination problem is reinforced by democratic preference 
change within national constituencies. A significant shift from left 
to right wing governments has taken place since the Lisbon Euro-
pean Council, reflecting the fact that policy preferences within dif-
ferent constituencies are not cast in stone. Some of the recently 
elected governments have expressed fiscal policy preferences dif-
ferent from what the Stability Growth Pact demands. As a conse-
quence, they see the SGP as an obstacle and some voices have 
called for reform.
14  Although the Pact worked quite successfully 
during the first two or three years of the EMU, it now seems that it 
only fared well during boom times and not during a recession. Yet, 
                                                 
13  The Commission has more than 1,500 legal actions pending against member 
states for breaches of EU legislation. (Financial Times, 23.04.03). 
14   Coeure and Pisani-Ferry, 2003, discuss some proposals. Collignon: Is Europe going far enough? 241 
 
even this is doubtful. There was clearly a lack of commitment to 
balance structural deficits in several countries. Pro-cyclical tax cuts 
reinforced the subsequent difficulties in keeping to the 3 percent 
deficit limit. The “sinning countries”, Portugal, Germany, France 
and Italy are those who made the least adjustments during boom 
times and are now blaming the Pact for the lack of flexibility that 
inhibits governments from running higher deficits in adverse envi-
ronments.
15 These critics effectively call for more discretion in fis-
cal policy. However, the whole point of the Pact was to prevent this 
kind of ‘flexibility’. If one were to increase ‘flexibility’ in national 
budget positions (not in the aggregate stance!), the most likely out-
come would be a more volatile monetary policy with less, rather 
than more macroeconomic stability. For more discretion in national 
budgets would create an uncoordinated aggregate stance. The ECB, 
acting as a Stackelberg-follower would have to adjust interest rates 
more often and this creates instability in financial markets with 
negative consequences for output. Hence, what is needed is flexibil-
ity in the coordinated aggregate budget position. The question arises 
whether the rule-based coordination between autonomous fiscal au-
thorities can be optimal over time, if it is not delegated to the Euro-
pean level. This leads us to a second fault-line, which is the Pact’s 
lack of flexibility with respect to shifting democratic policy prefer-
ences. 
 
 
The fatal flaw:  Lack of democracy 
 
National governments are accountable to their national constituen-
cies, and ultimately democratic choice through elections will always 
have primacy over negotiated intergovernmental coordination. The 
conferral of budget policy to the EU-level is therefore problematic, 
for a fundamental principle of democracy is “no taxation without 
representation”. For this reason the Maastricht Treaty has left re-
sponsibility for fiscal policy at the national level, whilst the SGP 
has constrained it by the hard coordination rule: keep structural 
                                                 
15   The Commission President Romano Prodi has called the SGP ‘stupid’ because 
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deficits in balance.
16 This rule is set forever and applies to each 
member country. It is a technocratic rule to which democratic gov-
ernments have subscribed, but there is no mechanism to deal with 
the problem of preference change. Inevitably this must lead to the 
de-legitimisation of European policies. The experience of the US 
can be used as a stylised reference. In the 1980’s, under the 
Reagan/Volker policy mix, government deficits and interest rates 
were high, whereas under the Clinton-Greenspan policy mix in the 
1990’s, deficits and interest rates were low. These two different pol-
icy mixes indicate varying democratic priorities for economic poli-
cies.
17  In the EU, however, the policy preference for balanced 
budgets in the Stability and Growth Pact is written in stone.  
 
The choice of an efficient policy mix among an infinite variety of 
consistent combinations of monetary and aggregate fiscal policy 
must be made at the EU-level. An optimal policy mix would maxi-
mise European citizens’ preferences, not those of governments. The 
democratic principle applied to delegation would translate into: “No 
European fiscal policy without representation”. On other words, 
European collective choice requires a European constituency. 
 
 
The Constitutional Challenge. 
 
If the European Union wants to sustain and improve its legitimacy 
as a policy-maker, it must function as a democratic society. Hence, 
it will need a mechanism to formulate policy preferences by Euro-
pean citizens at the European level. This is less a problem for inclu-
sive collective goods, where strategic complementarities provide the 
incentive for endogenous preference convergence and the Open 
Method of Coordination between governments will yield results. 
But the existence of exclusive collective goods requires not only 
delegation to the EU-level, but also the accountability of European 
policy makers to a singly European constituency. For example, as 
an exclusive collective good, the definition of the aggregate fiscal 
policy stance needs to be delegated to the European level, for only 
                                                 
16  At least that seems to be now the agreed interpretation of what it means to 
have “a medium-term budgetary position close to balance or in surplus”.  
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there can it be determined efficiently as a benchmark for monetary 
policy. However the definition of the aggregate deficit lacks legiti-
macy, unless it commands the consent of the majority of European 
citizens. The formation of collective preferences across Europe re-
quires the democratic competition between rival elites for rival pol-
icy agendas and the involvement of ordinary citizens in European-
wide policy deliberation (Hix, 2003). Clearly the control of the EU 
policy agenda by national governments with their bureaucratic in-
frastructure does not allow democratic competition.  
 
The active involvement of citizens in EU-wide policy deliberation 
will happen if and only if they become voters that can censure a 
European government and this government will be accountable to 
its citizens. In the European Union this is not the case today. Euro-
pean policies are largely defined through deliberation in the Council, 
but governments’ accountability is to a national and not European 
constituencies. Political competition takes place within member 
states, not within Europe. As a consequence, national interests 
dominate collective European interests; the universal is dominated 
by the particular. The ‘common concern’ is substituted by the con-
cern of national governments to get re-elected and of national bu-
reaucrats to keep their competences. Therefore what is needed is not 
just a gouvernement économique, but effectively a Government of 
Europe. This is not a statement of faith, but the obvious conclusion 
from the logic of collective action. This logic gives us compelling 
reasons why exclusive collective goods are unlikely to be supplied 
optimally by large groups of countries on a voluntary basis. Confer-
ral of decision-making to a higher, European authority is necessary 
to improve welfare. A European Government, naturally evolving 
from the European Commission, must reflect European-wide policy 
preferences, but it would also contribute to their emergence by be-
ing elected by and accountable to European citizens
18 or their repre-
sentatives in the European Parliament. In practical terms this means 
that all economic policy competences for exclusive goods, such as 
stabilisation policy, must become a matter of co-decision with the 
                                                 
18   For the role of the private sector and engaged citizens in European-wide pol-
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European Parliament, rather than being monopolised by the Coun-
cil.
19 
 
It is often argued that fiscal policy-making should remain at the na-
tional level because national policy preferences are heterogeneous 
and centralisation creates preference frustration and other ineffi-
ciencies (see for example Alesina and Waczirac, 1999). However, 
this argument for subsidiarity is wrong. If a European government 
is liable to its citizens, the political process of electing such a gov-
ernment creates structures of policy competition and deliberation 
that will reduce preference heterogeneity and policy dissent. For the 
competition for individual votes by parties and candidates requires 
them to explain their policies and engage the electorate. Before 
choosing, voters seek information. New information will change old 
preferences. An integrated polity across Europe would emerge as a 
result of establishing a European government. Alternatively, if pol-
icy choices are made by national governments who are only ac-
countable to national constituencies, policy preferences will natu-
rally diverge and remain disjunct, given that national policy debates 
reflect the national constituency. Therefore the degree of dissent, 
preference heterogeneity and policy frustration is structurally higher 
if policy-making remains in the exclusive domain of natural gov-
ernments.
20 
 
The implications for stabilisation policies in EMU are important. 
The weakness of the Stability and Growth Pact is not its short-term 
inflexibility, i.e. the degree of binding obligation, but its lack of 
democratic legitimacy in the long term. In fact, hard budget con-
straints for fiscal authorities are a necessary condition for macro-
economic stability, but such institutional rules are only sustainable 
if they are backed by collective acceptance, expressed in the democ-
ratic choices of European citizens. The purely procedural argument 
that the SGP has been ratified by democratic governments is not a 
sufficient guarantee of its success or long-term legitimacy. What is 
necessary is to define the macro-economic policy stance at the 
European level, that coordinates implicitly the unified monetary 
                                                 
19   This applies in particular to the TEU articles 99, 100, 102, 103(§2), 104 (§ 6, 
7, 10, 14), 107 (§6), 111. 
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policy with the aggregate fiscal policy stance and reflects the de-
mocratic policy preferences of all citizens. (For practical implica-
tions see Amato 2002, Collignon 2003). 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Europe’s economic governance seems not only to be highly com-
plex and of doubtful efficiency, but it is also unlikely to be sustain-
able in the long run. The Open Method of Coordination as created 
under the Lisbon Strategy is not the solution for the optimal provi-
sion of collective policy goods that is required to make Europe ‘one 
of the most competitive economies’ in the world. The reason is that 
this method is only able to achieve results in the domain of inclu-
sive collective goods that create strategic complementarities and 
common synergies. But as a result of setting up EMU there is a 
large new class of collective goods, which cannot be efficiently 
provided by voluntary cooperation between national governments 
alone. They require not only policy coordination through hard rules 
to constrain deviating behaviour, but also full democratic legitimacy 
for their implementation.  Today’s policy regime, dominated by an 
increasing number of intergovernmental policy arrangements re-
sembles the pre-democratic Ancién Regime. Unless it deals with its 
democratic deficit, the EU runs the risk of being thrown into the 
dustbin of History by a revolution, which would, unfortunately, 
have little to do with the noble principles that inspired European in-
tegration since Jean Monnet. The solution is endowing the Euro-
pean Union with a truly democratic constitution, putting European 
citizens at the centre rather than governmental bureaucrats. Any-
thing else risks the disintegration of Europe, given the increasing 
difficulties of voluntary policy coordination in an enlarged Euro-
pean Union. The conflicts around the Common Foreign and Secu-
rity Policy regarding the war on Iraq are early warning signs of dif-
ficult times ahead. 
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